On January 29, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed the Executive Order titled “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba”, effective at 12:01 a.m. Eastern Time on January 30, 2026. This action declares a national emergency regarding Cuba, citing the communist regime’s actions as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy. The order authorizes the potential imposition of additional ad valorem duties (tariffs) on imports from any country that directly or indirectly sells or provides oil to Cuba. It represents one of the most aggressive early moves in Trump’s second term, building on long-standing U.S. efforts to isolate Havana economically while targeting its lifeline: energy supplies.
Background: The Long-Standing U.S.-Cuba Tensions

U.S.-Cuba relations have been strained since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when Fidel Castro’s government nationalized American assets and aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The U.S. imposed a comprehensive economic embargo in the early 1960s, which has persisted through administrations of both parties. Efforts at détente under President Obama (2014–2016) included eased travel restrictions and diplomatic normalization, but these were partially rolled back under Trump’s first term (2017–2021), which tightened sanctions citing human rights abuses and Cuba’s support for Venezuela’s Maduro regime.

In Trump’s second term, starting January 20, 2025, the administration has pursued a hardline approach. Key figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio—a Cuban-American with deep ties to the Miami exile community—have advocated for maximum pressure to force regime change or significant concessions. Rubio has publicly linked Cuba’s stability to events in Venezuela, where a U.S.-backed operation in early January 2026 captured former President Nicolás Maduro, disrupting longstanding oil-for-services arrangements between Caracas and Havana.
Cuba’s economy has deteriorated sharply in recent years due to the embargo, the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on tourism, mismanagement, and external shocks. Chronic shortages of fuel, food, and medicine have led to blackouts, protests (notably in 2021), and mass migration—over 600,000 Cubans encountered at the U.S. border from 2022–2024. Oil imports are critical; without reliable supplies, power generation, transportation, and industry grind to a halt.

Historically, Cuba relied heavily on subsidized Venezuelan oil (up to 100,000 barrels per day at peak), in exchange for Cuban doctors and teachers. Sanctions and Venezuela’s decline reduced this to around 30,000 bpd by late 2025. Russia provided sporadic shipments (around 6,000 bpd), and other sources like Algeria contributed minimally. By 2025–2026, Mexico emerged as the top supplier, accounting for about 44% of Cuba’s imports (around 20,000–22,000 bpd earlier in 2025, dropping after U.S. pressure). Mexico’s state oil company Pemex shipped humanitarian-oriented cargoes, often at discounted rates, as part of leftist solidarity under previous administrations.
Details of the Executive Order
The EO invokes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act, granting broad authority for economic measures during declared emergencies. It accuses Cuba of:

Aligning with and supporting hostile actors: Russia (hosting a major signals intelligence facility), China, Iran, and transnational groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
Contributing to regional instability through migration encouragement, violence, and “malign” activities.
Posing direct threats to U.S. security via espionage and destabilization.

The core mechanism: It establishes a process for imposing additional tariffs on goods imported into the U.S. from third countries that supply oil (crude or petroleum products) to Cuba. This is a “secondary” sanction-style approach—similar to past measures against Iranian or Venezuelan oil buyers—punishing intermediaries rather than Cuba directly (already heavily embargoed).
Implementation steps include:

The Secretary of Commerce identifies oil-supplying countries.
The Secretary of State (in consultation with Commerce, Treasury, USTR, DHS, etc.) assesses threats and recommends tariff rates and targets.
The President makes final decisions on rates, scope, and any modifications.

No tariffs are automatic or immediately imposed; the order creates a framework requiring follow-on determinations and guidance. The White House fact sheet emphasizes this as a tool to protect U.S. interests and pressure Cuba to “align sufficiently” with American national security and foreign policy objectives—potentially opening doors to dialogue or concessions.
The order supersedes inconsistent prior actions and can be modified if circumstances change.
Potential Targets and Impacts

Primary focus falls on Mexico, now Cuba’s lifeline supplier. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum condemned the move, warning of a potential humanitarian crisis in Cuba (blackouts, medicine shortages, food distribution failures). Sheinbaum stated Mexico would seek diplomatic solutions and alternatives to aid Cuba, framing shipments as sovereign decisions not driven by U.S. pressure. Reports indicate Mexico temporarily suspended some shipments post-EO, citing trade talks and invasion threats.

Russia could face secondary effects, though its volumes are smaller and irregular. Other minor suppliers (e.g., Algeria) are less likely targets due to low trade volumes with the U.S.
For Cuba, the order exacerbates an already dire energy crisis. Fuel shortages cause widespread blackouts (up to 20+ hours daily in some areas), paralyze agriculture and industry, and fuel public discontent. Analysts warn of deepened humanitarian suffering, though the U.S. frames it as necessary to counter malign influence.
Reactions and Global Responses
U.S. Supporters: Hardline Cuban-American lawmakers like Rep. Carlos Giménez applauded the EO as targeting the regime effectively. Rubio has tied it to broader goals of regime change, suggesting post-Maduro Cuba could follow.

Cuba’s Government: President Miguel Díaz-Canel denounced it as “fascist, criminal, and genocidal,” accusing the U.S. of economic strangulation under false pretexts. Havana called it a violation of international law and an attempt at absolute fuel blockade. State media framed it as aggression, vowing resilience and no surrender.
Mexico: Sheinbaum emphasized preventing humanitarian fallout and pursuing dialogue, while rejecting coercion.
International Left/Progressive Groups: Organizations like the Cuba Solidarity Campaign (UK) and Peoples Dispatch condemned it as escalation of the decades-long blockade, hypocritical given U.S. alliances with authoritarian regimes.
Critics in Media/Analysis: Outlets like WSWS and some Latin American reports view it as imperial overreach, part of the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine—asserting U.S. dominance in the hemisphere against rivals like China and Russia.
Neutral/Trade Observers: Legal firms (Holland & Knight, Clark Hill) note it’s not an immediate tariff but a process—businesses should monitor for designations affecting supply chains.
Broader Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

This EO fits Trump’s “America First” approach: using tariffs as leverage in trade and security. It echoes secondary sanctions on Venezuelan oil buyers and signals to adversaries that aiding sanctioned entities carries costs. In the context of great-power competition, it aims to disrupt Cuba’s ties to Russia/China/Iran.
Yet, risks include straining U.S.-Mexico relations (USMCA partner), humanitarian backlash, and limited effectiveness—Cuba has endured sanctions for 60+ years. Migration pressures could rise if conditions worsen.
As of early February 2026, no specific tariffs have been announced—implementation depends on interagency action. The move underscores Trump’s rapid pace in reshaping hemispheric policy, but its success hinges on enforcement and Cuba’s response.